Formalizing the Elite Xenophilia Hypothesis

Table of contents Link to heading

• Executive summary
• Scope, assumptions, and conceptual framing
• Mechanisms, motive types, and the cycle model
• Comparative empirical record
• Counterarguments and alternative explanations
• Normative and policy implications
• Research design and evidence gaps

Executive summary Link to heading

This report formalizes the elite xenophilia hypothesis as a family of hypotheses rather than a single claim. The core idea is that elite preference for outsiders can function as a form of demographic statecraft: elites sometimes support immigration, settlement, recruitment, regularization, or naturalization because outsiders are economically useful, politically incorporable, morally valorized, or strategically preferable to historically rooted majorities that are seen as electorally constraining, culturally embarrassing, or institutionally obstructive. In the literature on migration politics, the strongest support is for instrumental and structural variants of this thesis, especially those emphasizing employer demand, party coalition-building, rights-based legal drift, and what Gary Freeman called “client politics.” The evidence is weaker for the strongest version: that elites are centrally coordinated and chiefly motivated by conscious spite toward natives. Existing scholarship does show, however, that elites in several democracies are often more cosmopolitan than average citizens, and that elite preferences matter disproportionately in immigration and refugee policy. \[1\]

A rigorous version of the thesis therefore distinguishes between four levels. The spiteful-intentional version says elites knowingly use outsider settlement to dilute a majority they resent. The instrumental version says elites pursue outsiders for labor, votes, legitimacy, or state-building benefits, even without overt hostility to natives. The structural version says no one need conspire: organized pro-immigration interests are concentrated and mobilized, while restrictionist publics are diffuse and episodic. The unconscious or status-cosmopolitan version says elite socialization inclines upper-status actors toward universalist or outsider-favoring attitudes even when they do not explicitly seek demographic replacement. The comparative record below finds substantial evidence for the instrumental and structural variants, recurrent but mixed evidence for the unconscious/status-cosmopolitan variant, and only partial, case-specific evidence for the spiteful-intentional variant. \[2\]

The self-defeating part of the thesis is better supported. Across cases, migrants or migrant-descended populations rarely remain passive instruments. Once residence becomes durable through family reunification, labor-market embeddedness, schooling, territorial concentration, legal status regularization, or naturalization, newcomers acquire the classic attributes of political actors: associations, unions, parties, brokers, lobbies, clergy, media, and electoral leverage. Scholarly work on political incorporation treats this as a standard process; the key analytic move here is to emphasize that it means ethnic politics does not disappear. Instead, it is reconstituted under new demographic conditions. \[3\]

The comparative evidence is consistent with this transformed-grievance model. In the United States, the 1965 immigration regime and long-run naturalization created a major immigrant electorate, yet immigrant-origin voters have not remained permanent clients of one party; in 2024 Hispanic voters were close to evenly split. In Germany, “guest workers” recruited as temporary labor became durable communities, citizens, MPs, and a central object of party competition. In Argentina, a constitutionally explicit Europeanization project produced not a depoliticized nation but immigrant labor radicalism and urban machine politics. In Jordan, naturalization of Palestinians produced an enduring Jordanian-Palestinian cleavage rather than post-ethnic harmony. In Sri Lanka, Indian Tamil plantation labor evolved into a geographically concentrated voting bloc. In Côte d’Ivoire, decades of migrant openness fed later struggles over citizenship, land, and “ivoirité.” \[4\]

The best conclusion, then, is not that the thesis is universally true in its strongest form. It is that a formalized medium-strength version is plausible and empirically testable: elites often support outsider incorporation for coalitional, economic, legitimating, or ideological reasons that can weaken established native majorities in the short or medium run; yet where settlement becomes durable, those outsiders predictably become rooted political actors, so the politics of grievance, representation, and group competition is transformed rather than abolished. \[5\]

Scope, assumptions, and conceptual framing Link to heading

This report treats the thesis as a comparative, long-run hypothesis spanning the nineteenth century to the present. “Elite” is used broadly to include state executives, colonial administrators, party leaders, judges, high bureaucrats, business coalitions, major landowners, and institutional gatekeepers. “Historically rooted native majority” is used in an institutional-political sense, not a biological one: it refers to the population widely understood inside a polity to be the incumbent nation-bearing majority or founding core. “Xenophilia” is used here analytically, as an elite preference for outsiders over insiders, not simply curiosity about foreign cultures. “Demographic engineering” is used in the political-demography sense: state or elite-directed action that changes the size, composition, or distribution of populations for political ends. \[6\]

A central analytical caution is that motives are harder to observe than mechanisms. Archival records, statutes, and statistics often reveal who was admitted, how legal status changed, which sectors demanded labor, and which parties benefited electorally. They reveal much less directly whether elites acted “out of spite.” For that reason, this report treats spite as a high-threshold claim. It is most credible where primary documents openly disparage the local population, where policymakers explicitly describe newcomers as a corrective to native political behavior, or where native resistance is not merely overruled but morally pathologized. The literature on migration politics more commonly documents client politics, liberal-rights constraints, labor demand, and strategic coalition formation than explicit anti-native ressentiment. \[7\]

The report therefore formalizes the thesis in nested versions, shown below.

Table note: the typology synthesizes work on demographic engineering, the migration state, client politics, liberal-state acceptance of unwanted immigration, and elite cosmopolitanism. \[8\]

This framing also clarifies what the thesis is not saying. It does not require a single centralized conspiracy. It does not imply that every immigration episode is anti-native. It does not deny the reality of labor shortages, humanitarian obligations, imperial legacies, or demographic aging. Rather, it asks whether those publicly stated reasons sometimes become vehicles for a deeper and politically consequential shift: the replacement of an incumbent majority’s weight with a more fragmented, dependent, or newly incorporable population. That question is squarely within the field of political demography. \[9\]

Mechanisms, motive types, and the cycle model Link to heading

The thesis becomes sharper when disaggregated into mechanisms. Politically, elites may see outsider incorporation as a way to build new electorates, fragment inherited majorities, or bypass territorially rooted veto players. Economically, migrants can ease labor shortages, discipline wages, expand consumer markets, or populate frontier and plantation economies. Rhetorically, elites can recode opposition to demographic change as immoral, racist, backward, or anti-modern, thereby converting a conflict over sovereignty and representation into a conflict over virtue. Legally, once systems of family reunification, asylum, labor recruitment, or naturalization exist, they generate self-reinforcing flows that exceed the original announced purpose. Institutionally, schools, unions, churches, municipalities, and parties then transform newcomers from workers or wards into organized constituencies. These mechanisms are well aligned with Freeman’s “client politics,” Hollifield’s “migration state,” and Joppke’s account of why liberal states accept immigration they cannot or will not fully restrict. \[10\]

The motive typology can be stated more rigorously. Spiteful motives involve punitive affect toward the native majority: the local majority is treated not simply as one constituency but as morally defective and therefore fit to be bypassed. Instrumental motives focus on labor, votes, external alliances, state-building, or fiscal and developmental goals. Structural motives emerge from institutional asymmetries: employers, faith groups, rights advocates, and migrant networks are organized and persistent, while native restrictionist preferences are broad but poorly organized except during crises. Unconscious motives arise when educated or upper-status actors are socialized into cosmopolitan norms that elevate openness and stigmatize inherited ethnonational claims. Cross-national research suggests elites in top positions are often more cosmopolitan than average citizens, which makes the last mechanism empirically plausible even where direct strategy is absent. \[11\]

Rhetorical moralization deserves particular stress because it is the bridge between elite preference and mass compliance. Research on party communication finds that immigration is often discussed in highly moralized language, and experimental work shows elite framing can significantly shape public attitudes toward immigration policy. This matters for the present thesis because moralized discourse does not merely persuade; it also delegitimizes native-majority resistance by redefining it as vice rather than interest. That does not prove spite, but it does identify a mechanism by which elites can weaken majority self-assertion without openly proclaiming demographic designs. \[12\]

The strongest formal statement of the thesis is a cycle model:

This stylized sequence summarizes an argument already implicit in the literature on incorporation and political demography: demography changes institutions, and institutions then change demography’s political effects. Once migrants are settled, the relevant question is no longer simply how many arrived. It is whether they have become corporate actors with staying power. The historical cases below repeatedly show that they do. \[13\]

Three observable implications follow. First, if the thesis is right, elite-supported openness should correlate not only with labor demand or humanitarian need but also with moments of majority management: periods when incumbent majorities are electorally difficult, territorially obstructive, or culturally resistant. Second, migrant-origin populations should move over time from labor pools to autonomous political actors. Third, the long-run result should be not post-ethnic peace but a new field of group competition, often layered atop older conflicts. The empirical record strongly supports the second and third propositions; support for the first varies sharply by case. \[14\]

Comparative empirical record Link to heading

The table below compares major cases that fit the hypothesis to differing degrees.

Table note: this comparison draws on official sources and academic case studies cited in the paragraphs that follow. \[15\]

A short quantitative snapshot helps show the demographic-to-political transition.

Table note: the demographic indicators come from the U.S. Census Bureau, Pew Research Center, Destatis, INDEC, UNRWA, Verité Research, ReliefWeb, and the World Bank; the incorporation indicators come from Pew, Mediendienst, academic histories, Freedom House and the U.S. State Department, Verité, and scholarship on Côte d’Ivoire. \[16\]

In the United States, the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act replaced national-origins quotas with a preference system centered on family reunification and skills. Official U.S. government histories describe this as the end of the discriminatory quota system and the adoption of a framework designed to reunite families. Over time, that legal architecture helped generate a much larger settled foreign-born and naturalized population: the foreign-born share rose from 4.7% in 1970 to 13.9% in 2022, and Pew estimated that naturalized citizens accounted for one in ten eligible voters in 2024. Yet the resulting electorate did not behave as a fixed elite client bloc. By 2024, Democrats were far more racially diverse than in the 1990s, but Hispanic voters were nearly evenly divided in the presidential election, showing that incorporation produces autonomous blocs, not permanent instruments. Historical research on urban politics reinforces the point: immigrant naturalization rose where parties needed immigrant votes and where immigrant networks already existed. \[17\]

In Germany, the guest-worker system is a nearly textbook example of the cycle model. The federal government commemorates the 1961 recruitment agreement with Turkey and notes that workers were initially expected to stay only briefly; the planned rotation principle was later abandoned partly at firms’ request because employers wanted to keep trained workers. What began as temporary labor became durable settlement. Destatis now reports roughly 25.8 million people with a migrant background in private households in 2025, or about 31.1% of the total shown in the microcensus first results, and 291,955 naturalizations in 2024, the highest since records began in 2000. Turkish naturalizations more than doubled year-on-year in 2024. By 2025, Mediendienst counted at least 73 MPs with migration history in the new Bundestag, while migration itself remained a central object of parliamentary struggle. The original labor instrument had become a permanent component of the political nation. \[18\]

In Argentina, the demographic-engineering logic was more explicit. Article 25 of the constitution states that the federal government shall foster European immigration and may not restrict or tax the entry of foreigners coming to farm, improve industry, or teach the sciences and arts. Argentina’s own migration museum explains that Alberdi’s Bases helped inspire this constitutional project, and Alberdi argued for friendship and commerce treaties as a route to putting South American civilization under the protection of world civilization. Historical studies show that Argentina remained comparatively open to mass migration until the 1930s, largely because pro-immigration interests—especially landowners—kept restrictions moderate. The result was not a depoliticized society. Early twentieth-century labor radicalism in Argentina was strikingly immigrant; scholarship on anarchism, socialism, and Buenos Aires machine politics consistently treats immigrants as central actors. In other words, a state project meant to populate and transform the nation generated new urban mass politics rather than ending politics of collective identity. \[19\]

The demographic scale of the Argentine case was extraordinary. Migration Policy Institute’s recent overview, drawing on official sources, notes that between 1830 and 1950 Argentina received 8.2 million European immigrants and that in 1914 immigrants were nearly 30% of the population; INDEC historical material similarly records foreigners at 28.7% around the end of 1914. By 2022, the foreign-born population had fallen to about 4.2%, but the political legacy of that immigration wave—union traditions, socialist and anarchist currents, machine politics, and enduring debates about national identity—was already embedded. This makes Argentina a strong fit for the thesis’s self-defeating dimension, even if the motive structure mixed civilizational aspiration with economic development rather than sheer malice. \[20\]

In Jordan, the key mechanism was not mass labor recruitment but citizenship incorporation. Jordan’s 1954 nationality law classified as Jordanian nationals non-Jewish persons who possessed Palestinian nationality before 15 May 1948 and were ordinarily resident in the kingdom. Unlike most Arab host states, Jordan granted citizenship to West Bank residents and many Palestinian refugees. UNRWA reports that more than 2.39 million registered Palestine refugees live in Jordan, the largest number in any UNRWA field. Yet incorporation did not dissolve group politics. PalQuest notes that Palestinians resented Jordan’s annexation and naturalization strategy; contemporary monitors report that citizens of Palestinian origin make up most of the overall population but remain politically underrepresented, and the U.S. State Department has similarly stated that citizens of Palestinian origin are underrepresented at all levels of government and the military. This is a powerful instance of the thesis’s final proposition: incorporation changed the terms of conflict, but did not end it. \[21\]

In Sri Lanka, the British colonial state imported Indian Tamil labor to work coffee, tea, and rubber plantations, and Verité Research dates the main settlement wave from 1837 to 1939. At independence, the new state did not integrate these workers as full members; instead, Hill Country Tamils were largely denied citizenship, producing statelessness and political exclusion. But the long-run effect was still the creation of a durable, territorially concentrated claimant community. Verité reports that the 2003 Grant of Citizenship to Persons of Indian Origin Act benefited more than 90,000 stateless persons, mostly from the Hill Country Tamil community, and explicitly states that grants of citizenship and voting rights helped consolidate the community into a voting bloc concentrated in plantation regions. More recent work argues that ethnic minority parties in Hill Country Tamil society have been using coalition leverage effectively, while contemporary reporting notes that plantation workers can swing elections by voting as a bloc. This is a strong case of the thesis’s transformation logic: colonial labor importation produced a long-lived ethnopolitical constituency. \[22\]

In Côte d’Ivoire, colonial and post-colonial authorities deliberately encouraged migration for plantation agriculture. Recent historical work describes both colonial and postcolonial migration policies as coercive and attractive, making the country a major migration hub. Houphouët-Boigny’s regime is repeatedly associated with a liberal land-and-migration formula—famously summarized as “the land belongs to the person who develops it” or “those who produce on it.” Legal and historical studies argue that under these liberal policies many migrants and their descendants exercised the rights of nationals and were treated as such, even when formal naturalization lagged. The long-run result, however, was not the disappearance of identity politics. ReliefWeb notes that foreigners made up 26% of the population in 1998, while the World Bank still places international migrant stock at 9.0% in 2024. As the economy slowed and succession politics intensified, “ivoirité” became a weapon for excluding rivals such as Alassane Ouattara and for contesting the belonging of northerners and migrant-origin populations. Openness generated prosperity first, then a sharpened politics of citizenship, land, and authenticity. \[23\]

Taken together, these cases support a restrained but substantial conclusion. Elite-led openness often begins as labor policy, settlement policy, constitutional design, annexation, or state-building. Yet where outsiders remain and are gradually incorporated, they predictably cease to be instruments and become constituencies. At that point, grievances are not extinguished but redistributed across old natives, earlier migrants, newer migrants, and state institutions. The comparative evidence strongly supports that transformation dynamic, even though the exact motives behind the initial elite choices vary widely across cases. \[14\]

Counterarguments and alternative explanations Link to heading

The most important counterargument is that what looks like demographic engineering is often better explained by ordinary political economy. Germany needed labor during the Wirtschaftswunder; the United States ended discriminatory quotas during the civil-rights era and used family reunification as an organizing principle; Argentina wanted labor and population for frontier agriculture; Sri Lanka’s plantation economy depended on imported labor; Côte d’Ivoire’s cocoa and coffee sectors demanded migrant workers; Jordan’s naturalization of Palestinians was bound up with annexation, sovereignty, and state-building. In those versions, elites are not trying primarily to punish natives. They are trying to solve development, labor, legitimacy, or geopolitical problems. \[24\]

A second counterargument comes from the theory of the liberal paradox. Liberal states may accept more immigration than voters appear to want because they are committed to rule-bound markets, due process, family rights, refugee protection, and judicial review. Joppke’s argument about “unwanted immigration” fits many Western cases: once rights are institutionalized, states cannot easily control the long-run consequences of earlier admissions. On this account, elite “openness” may be less a plot against natives than the unintended product of constitutional liberalism and transnational rights regimes. \[25\]

A third counterargument is evidentiary. The claim that elites are motivated by spite toward natives is often psychologically vivid but empirically thin. Spite is difficult to infer from statutes alone. In some cases—such as Argentina’s nineteenth-century civilizational rhetoric or certain modern moralizations of immigration—elite discourse does contain unmistakable contempt for local or “backward” populations. But across most cases the record more often shows interest aggregation than naked hostility: employers want labor, parties want voters, states want settlers, courts protect rights, and bureaucracies routinize admission. Where the spite claim is made, it is best treated as a hypothesis requiring unusually strong archival proof. \[26\]

There is also a conceptual counterargument to the report’s own framing: perhaps ethnic grievance politics does not merely persist under new conditions; perhaps it becomes less salient over time as migrants assimilate, intermarry, and enter broader class or ideological coalitions. That possibility is real and should not be dismissed. Political incorporation research shows that immigrants can become ordinary citizens rather than permanent ethnopolitical blocs. At the same time, the cases reviewed here suggest that assimilation does not erase the politics of belonging so much as recode it. Group boundaries blur in some dimensions while hardening in others, and new cleavages arise over welfare, religion, language, land, and symbolic ownership of the state. \[27\]

The best overall assessment, therefore, is mixed. The thesis is too strong if it says all major immigration openness is centrally planned anti-native replacement driven by spite. It is well supported if it says elites often welcome outsiders for reasons that can weaken inherited majorities and that the long-run effect of such openness is to create new political actors and new grievances rather than an enduring post-ethnic equilibrium. \[28\]

Normative and policy implications Link to heading

If the medium-strength thesis is right, the principal normative issue is democratic candor. Immigration policy should not be sold in one register—humanitarian necessity, temporary labor, skills, or moral obligation—when policymakers know it will also alter the social basis of representation, party competition, and national identity. A serious democracy should debate immigration as both an economic and a constitutional question. The U.S., German, Jordanian, Sri Lankan, and Ivorian cases all show that legal status and admissions policy can have durable political consequences far beyond the initial stated rationale. \[29\]

At the same time, the report does not support illiberal conclusions such as collective punishment of migrants or the denial of basic rights to settled populations. The comparative evidence points in the opposite direction: once populations are durably resident, trying to keep them permanently rightless often intensifies grievance and instability. Research on political incorporation and migrant civic participation suggests that orderly pathways to representation, rights, and accountability are central to stable democratic integration. In other words, if elites create durable settlement, the least destructive response is not indefinite limbo but transparent incorporation under clear rules. \[30\]

A prudent policy response would therefore combine front-end realism with back-end integration. Front-end realism means describing likely demographic and political consequences openly, using published projections, labor-market evidence, and school and housing capacity data, rather than moral slogans alone. Back-end integration means strengthening naturalization procedures, language acquisition, civic education, anti-ghettoization measures, and institutions that encourage common political membership rather than permanent clientelism. The literature does not show that demographic change can be made politically costless; it does suggest that unclear objectives and half-integrated populations are among the worst outcomes. \[31\]

One especially important implication follows from the report’s central irony. If newcomers eventually become rooted political actors, then policies aimed at diluting one majority by importing or incorporating outsiders are normatively unstable. They fail on their own terms. They do not eliminate politics of peoplehood; they create successor politics of peoplehood. A defensible immigration regime, then, should avoid treating migrants as demographic instruments—whether for cheap labor, coalition maintenance, territorial consolidation, or moral performance. Human beings become citizens, neighbors, claimants, opponents, and officeholders. Policy that forgets this will tend to reproduce the very ethnic competition it imagines it can escape. \[32\]

Research design and evidence gaps Link to heading

The hypothesis is testable, but only if it is operationalized carefully. A strong design would separate motive, mechanism, and outcome. For motives, the best evidence comes from cabinet minutes, legislative debates, private correspondence, elite interviews, and computational text analysis of parliamentary speech. For mechanisms, the key evidence is institutional: labor-recruitment treaties, family-reunification statutes, naturalization reforms, voter-registration rules, settlement incentives, land laws, and judicial decisions. For outcomes, the central indicators are census change, naturalization uptake, precinct-level voting, party formation, union membership, candidate emergence, and the salience of belonging-related rhetoric. Recent work in political demography, political incorporation, and computational analysis of immigration rhetoric points to exactly these kinds of data. \[33\]

Several concrete empirical tests would be especially informative. First, an archival-discourse test could compare elite private communications with public justifications to assess whether demographic or anti-native motives are concealed behind labor or humanitarian language. Second, an event-study design could examine whether regularizations, citizenship reforms, or settlement programs cluster around moments of majority electoral instability. Third, a geo-political incorporation design could track whether immigrant concentration predicts subsequent candidate emergence, party brokerage, and machine formation. Historical work on immigrant naturalization in U.S. wards already shows how useful such designs can be: naturalization increased where party demand and social networks aligned. \[34\]

Two evidence gaps are especially large. The first is the gap between elite worldview and policy choice. We have some evidence that elites are more cosmopolitan than mass publics, and some evidence that elite preferences matter in refugee policy, but we have much less direct comparative evidence that elite pro-outsider attitudes systematically translate into policies aimed at weakening native majorities. The second is the gap between incorporation and grievance transformation. Many case studies show that immigrants become political actors; fewer trace in a disciplined way how one form of grievance politics morphs into another across generations. Filling those gaps would require linking archival intent, demographic change, and long-run party formation in the same research design. \[35\]

The most defensible formal statement emerging from this review is therefore the following: elite xenophilia can be modeled as a variable form of demographic statecraft whose observable mechanisms are labor recruitment, legal incorporation, rhetorical moralization, and institutional settlement; its strongest short-run effects may weaken an incumbent native majority, but its long-run effect is usually to generate new rooted actors and thus new politics of grievance, representation, and belonging. That statement is broad enough to fit the comparative evidence, narrow enough to be tested, and cautious enough not to claim more intention than the record typically proves. \[36\]

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\[3\] \[14\] \[27\] \[30\] \[32\] From Aliens to Citizens: The Political Incorporation of …

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\[4\] \[15\] \[17\] Public Law 89-236

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\[6\] \[8\] the state-directed movement of ethnic groups as a …

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\[9\] \[13\] \[31\] \[33\] The Political Consequences of Structural Population Change

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\[12\] When Do Political Parties Moralize?: A Cross-National …

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\[16\] The Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 2022

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\[18\] \[24\] Merkel pays tribute to the lifetime achievements of guest …

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\[19\] National Constitution

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\[20\] \[26\] Founded with Immigration in Mind, Argentina Has …

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\[21\] Law No. 6 of 1954 on Nationality (last amended 1987)

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\[22\] Hill Country Tamils of Sri Lanka

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\[23\] Migrants in the Plantation Economy in Côte d’Ivoire: A Historical …

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\[25\] Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration

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\[29\] Post-War Years

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\[34\] Immigrant Group Size and Political Mobilization

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\[35\] The Cosmopolitanism of Elites In Many Countries, the …

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