Lawyers, Institutions, and Moral Order in the “Yankee Nation” Folkways Lens

Executive Summary Link to heading

The claim that lawyers function as an “operational/enforcement arm” of an institutional, moralizing order is partially supported—but only if stated precisely: lawyers are typically not the sovereign source of institutional power, yet they often act as the key operators who convert contested moral and political priorities into enforceable procedures, formal rights/duties, and legitimate coercion. This is especially visible where (a) the state delegates rulemaking and enforcement to legal-bureaucratic machinery, (b) large organizations use law strategically as governance, and (c) procedural complexity becomes an asymmetric weapon. Classic sociology of professions predicts this: professions claim a specialized “jurisdiction,” monopolize credentialed tasks, and maintain authority partly by translating lay disputes into expert-managed domains. \[1\]

Using a “folkways” framing—where the user’s “Yankee nation” evokes a historically moralizing, institution-building cultural style—helps explain why legal institutions can feel like moral enforcement rather than neutral conflict resolution. But this is a heuristic, not a single accepted scientific taxonomy of American regions: the relevant sources (e.g., Albion’s Seed\[2\] and American Nations\[3\]) present interpretive, historically rooted cultural models rather than a settled causal theory. \[4\]

Evidence from historical and contemporary cases shows two-sidedness: the same legal craft that entrenched hierarchy (e.g., segregation-era legalism) also enabled reform (e.g., civil-rights litigation). Courts and agencies sometimes discipline legal power through constitutional limits, procedural rights, and professional-ethics regimes; nonetheless, those constraints often operate slowly and unevenly—creating space for “control via procedure,” including delay, cost, and technicality. \[5\]

Theoretical framing Link to heading

Folkways lens and “moralizing institutions” Link to heading

“Folkways” in the classic sociological sense are durable norms and customary practices that become socially regulating over time. Folkways\[6\] defines folkways as societally regulating patterns that arise from repetition and become a social force. \[7\] Albion’s Seed\[2\] repurposes “folkways” for a long-run cultural history of the United States\[8\], arguing that early-settler cultural patterns persist across centuries. \[9\] American Nations\[3\] similarly proposes rival regional cultures (including “Yankeedom”) shaping political life. \[10\]

What makes this lens relevant to law is that “moralizing” orders often express themselves through institution-building (schools, bureaucracies, courts, regulators) and through the elevation of “procedural righteousness” (what counts as legitimate, fair, civilized). Sociologically, this aligns with accounts of modern authority as rational-legal: legitimacy flows from rule-bound procedures administered by trained officials, rather than (only) personal charisma or tradition. \[11\]

Sociology of professions and the legal “jurisdiction” claim Link to heading

Core findings from sociology of professions map cleanly onto lawyering:

Professions compete for and defend jurisdictions over socially valued tasks; law claims jurisdiction over interpreting rules, representing parties, and mediating institutional conflict. The System of Professions\[12\] \[13\]
Professionalization is tied to credentialing, closure, and status, which helps convert expertise into authority and bargaining power inside institutions. The Rise of Professionalism\[14\] \[15\]
In law specifically, the “legal field” can exercise symbolic power by defining what counts as a valid claim, who is credible, and which harms are cognizable—turning political struggles into technical disputes over categories and procedure. Pierre Bourdieu\[16\] \[17\]

This does not imply omnipotence. It suggests that when institutions need enforceable decisions, they frequently act through lawyers (as translators, gatekeepers, and operators), because law is a socially legitimate language for coercion.

Legal instrumentalism and “law as governance technology” Link to heading

Legal instrumentalism (and adjacent traditions such as legal realism) emphasizes that law is often used as an instrument to achieve policy and governance aims—sometimes openly, sometimes under the guise of neutrality. \[18\] Even the internal architecture of administrative law reflects this: the U.S. Department of Justice\[19\] describes the Administrative Procedure Act\[20\] system as structured around rulemaking and adjudication procedures that govern how agencies act. \[21\]

The implication for the user’s claim is specific: lawyers become the operational arm when institutions need (1) translation into rule categories, (2) procedural navigation, and (3) enforcement through courts, agencies, or contracts.

Historical case studies Link to heading

Gilded Age corporate lawyering and state-building for capital Link to heading

Context. Late-19th to early-20th century political economy in the U.S. saw rapid corporate consolidation and a legal struggle over the boundaries of state power, contract, and monopoly. One key institutional channel was corporate charter competition and corporate-law development—especially through state corporation statutes and the markets they created. \[22\]

Actors. State legislatures and courts; corporate managers; elite corporate counsel and emerging large-firm professional systems (later formalized into large-firm “systems” of recruitment and specialization). \[23\]

Legal tactics used.
Corporate-law enabling + jurisdiction shopping: statutes like New Jersey\[24\]’s general corporate legislation and Delaware\[25\] corporate law enabled large-scale incorporation and governance structures. \[26\]
Constitutional and doctrinal strategies: decisions such as Lochner-era contract-liberty reasoning framed labor regulation as interference with liberty of contract. \[27\]
Antitrust as counter-enforcement: Congress and courts sometimes used law to check consolidation via the Sherman Antitrust Act\[28\] and case law culminating in major structural remedies against monopolies. \[29\]
Corporate constitutional claims (contested): corporate-rights arguments were advanced in multiple late-19th-century contexts, including the corporate-personhood debate associated with Santa Clara reporting and later doctrine. \[30\]

Outcomes.
Lawyers and courts helped build a governable corporate order—consolidation became administratively legible and legally durable (charters, fiduciary structures, contract enforcement). At the same time, antitrust law became a competing institutional enforcement tool. The result was not “lawyers control society” so much as: institutional governance of capitalism became heavily lawyer-mediated, creating unequal advantages for repeat players and well-resourced organizations. \[31\]

Jim Crow legalism and the juridical maintenance of racial hierarchy Link to heading

Context. Post-Reconstruction racial hierarchy in the South and beyond was stabilized not only by violence and economics but by legal architecture: court decisions narrowing federal civil-rights enforcement, state segregation laws, and election/jury systems that excluded Black citizens. \[32\]

Actors. State governments, local registrars and courts; federal and state judiciaries; litigants and civil-rights organizations.

Legal tactics used.
Doctrinal narrowing of federal protection: The Civil Rights Cases (1883) sharply limited federal power over private discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment framework then at issue, weakening legal protections created during Reconstruction. \[33\]
Segregation legitimation: Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) validated “separate but equal” as constitutional doctrine for state-imposed segregation. \[34\]
Disenfranchisement-by-procedure: The Court’s approach in Williams v. Mississippi (1898) and Giles v. Harris (1903) is widely analyzed as allowing (or declining to remedy) facially “neutral” procedural barriers that functioned to exclude Black civic participation. \[35\]
Penal labor loopholes and coercive legality: scholarship shows how the Constitution’s “punishment for crime” exception and postwar governance facilitated forced labor systems (including convict leasing) as legal-economic control. \[36\]

Outcomes.
Law—administered by lawyers, judges, and legal bureaucracies—became a stabilizing enforcement layer for racial hierarchy, making exclusion look procedurally legitimate and therefore harder to contest quickly. This is a strong historical instance where “moral order” (racial caste ideology) got operationalized through procedural legality. \[37\]

New Deal administrative law and lawyer-bureaucrats as policy operators Link to heading

Context. The New Deal expanded federal regulation and social insurance; governance increasingly ran through administrative agencies and legal procedure. \[38\]

Actors. The National Labor Relations Board\[39\] and other agencies; the executive branch; Congress; regulated industries; labor organizations; agency counsel and litigators.

Legal tactics used.
Statutory creation of administrative governance: the National Labor Relations Act\[40\] established federal labor rights and an enforcement board. \[41\]
Judicial legitimation of the administrative approach: NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel (1937) upheld federal labor regulation in a major test of Commerce Clause power. \[42\]
Institutional design disputes: Humphrey’s Executor (1935) is central to the legal architecture of independent agencies and their insulation from presidential removal. \[43\]
Procedural regularization: the Administrative Procedure Act\[20\] (1946) formalized rulemaking/adjudication, partly in response to concerns over agency power; the Attorney General’s committee report (1941) and the DOJ’s 1947 manual framed its purpose and structure. \[44\]

Outcomes.
This period illustrates lawyers as institutional operators: policymaking was increasingly “done” through drafting, rulemaking, hearings, enforcement actions, and judicial review—forms that require legal professionals. That can feel like “tyrannical control” when experienced from below, but it is also a core mechanism by which democratic statutes become enforceable governance. \[45\]

Civil-rights litigation as counter-enforcement and moral reconstruction Link to heading

Context. Mid-20th-century civil-rights reforms used courts as an attack vector against a prior moral order (segregation), demonstrating that “lawyer power” is not intrinsically conservative or oppressive.

Actors. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund\[46\] litigators; federal government; local school districts; the National Archives and Records Administration\[47\] as a keeper of key records; and key figures including Thurgood Marshall\[48\] and Chief Justice Earl Warren\[49\]. \[50\]

Legal tactics used.
Test-case strategy and constitutional argument: Brown v. Board of Education (1954) used Equal Protection doctrine to attack school segregation, reversing the legal legitimacy created under Plessy. \[51\]
Institutional coalition building through briefs and record-building: archives show extensive litigation infrastructure and coordination. \[52\]

Outcomes.
The same mechanisms that stabilize “order” (procedural regularity, precedent, legitimacy) can be re-aimed to dismantle an older moral order and reconstitute public norms. This is the strongest counterexample to any one-directional “attack dog” model of lawyers. \[53\]

Corporate regulatory capture and the revolving-door legal ecosystem Link to heading

Context. Regulatory capture theory predicts that regulated industries can shape regulation and enforcement, partly through asymmetries of expertise, access, and incentives. George Stigler\[54\] provided a canonical economic framework for this argument. \[55\]

Actors. Regulatory agencies; regulated firms; lobbyists; and lawyers moving between public enforcement and private practice (“revolving door”).

Legal tactics used.
Lobbying through a formal disclosure regime: the Lobbying Disclosure Act\[56\] explicitly frames lobbying as activity requiring public disclosure to maintain public confidence. \[57\]
Revolving-door hiring and enforcement incentives: empirical research links revolving-door dynamics to regulatory outcomes, including studies of how regulators’ career incentives can affect oversight. \[58\]

Outcomes.
In capture-friendly contexts, lawyers can function as an integrated part of a policy-production pipeline: they draft comments and rules, negotiate enforcement outcomes, design compliance regimes, and move between agencies and firms. Whether that is “tyrannical” depends on the substantive goals and accountability, but the institutional pattern is well documented. \[59\]

Contemporary examples Link to heading

Strategic lawsuits and SLAPPs as procedural coercion Link to heading

Context. SLAPPs are widely characterized as lawsuits that burden defendants with cost and process to chill participation and speech. The foundational academic framing comes from George W. Pring\[60\]’s early work, later echoed in modern anti-SLAPP statutes and model acts. \[61\]

Actors. Well-resourced plaintiffs (corporations, wealthy individuals, political actors), targeted speakers (media, activists), and courts.

Legal tactics used.
Forum selection and tort framing (defamation, trespass, conspiracy) aimed at reputational and economic damages; anti-SLAPP counter-tools attempt early dismissal and fee-shifting (e.g., the Uniform Law Commission\[62\] model “Public Expression Protection Act” materials). \[63\]

Outcome example (U.S.). In North Dakota\[64\], a high-profile litigation episode around pipeline protests produced a jury verdict and then reduced/finalized damages against Greenpeace entities (defamation/tort claims among others). Reuters reports a jury award and later a reduced final judgment. \[65\] The court documents reflect the structure of damages and interest and show how enormous financial exposure can be created through civil procedure. \[66\]

Comparative governance response (EU). The European Union\[67\] adopted an anti-SLAPP directive designed to protect public participation from abusive proceedings, institutionalizing early-dismissal and protective mechanisms at the supranational level. \[68\]

Mass torts, MDL aggregation, and settlement governance Link to heading

Context. Mass tort litigation is increasingly managed through multidistrict litigation (MDL), which centralizes cases for coordinated pretrial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1407. \[69\]

Actors. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation\[70\], transferee judges, plaintiffs’ firms, corporate defendants, and public entities (states, counties, tribes).

Legal tactics used.
Centralization + bellwether strategy + negotiated global settlements: JPML transfer orders and tag-along orders show how cases are aggregated; the federal judiciary reports that since MDL’s creation (1968), over a million actions have been centralized, with relatively few remanded for trial. \[71\]

Outcome example (opioids). The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio\[72\] hosts MDL 2804 (National Prescription Opiate Litigation), describing allegations about misrepresentation and distribution failures contributing to the opioid epidemic. \[73\] JPML documents show routine transfers into the MDL, underscoring how procedure channels thousands of claims into one managerial arena. \[74\] In parallel, bankruptcy litigation over opioid liabilities reached the Supreme Court of the United States\[75\] in Harrington v. Purdue Pharma (2024), illustrating how legal procedure also governs the boundary between collective resolution and individual consent. \[76\]

Class actions, arbitration, and the narrowing of collective enforcement Link to heading

Context. Rule 23 class actions have long been framed as a mechanism of aggregation and (often) private enforcement; but the modern system increasingly limits aggregation through certification standards and arbitration doctrine. The 1966 advisory committee notes show explicit concern with how class actions were categorized and administered. \[77\]

Actors. Plaintiffs’ counsel, corporate defense counsel, federal courts.

Legal tactics used.
Certification gatekeeping: in Wal-Mart v. Dukes (2011) the Court tightened “commonality” requirements in a massive employment discrimination class certification fight, limiting a nationwide class. \[78\]
Arbitration + class waiver enforcement: AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion (2011) and Epic Systems v. Lewis (2018) exemplify judicial enforcement of individualized arbitration agreements that displace class aggregation. \[79\]

Outcomes.
Procedural doctrine here has distributive effects: it can reduce collective deterrence and shift enforcement burdens either to agencies or to individualized (often impractical) claims. \[80\]

Compliance regimes as “soft coercion” backed by criminal authority Link to heading

Context. Modern corporate governance is heavily shaped by compliance expectations linked to charging, penalty mitigation, and organizational sentencing.

Actors. The U.S. Sentencing Commission\[81\], prosecutors, corporate compliance counsel, monitors.

Legal tactics used.
Organizational sentencing incentives: the Guidelines’ §8B2.1 sets criteria for an “effective compliance and ethics program,” embedding compliance as a penalty-mitigating governance technology. \[82\]
Prosecutorial evaluation frameworks: DOJ guidance on evaluating corporate compliance programs operationalizes expectations into checklists for charging and resolution decisions. \[83\]
Deferred prosecution and monitors: DOJ materials on monitors and DPAs show how enforcement can impose long-running governance oversight. \[84\]
Recent centralization: DOJ’s March 10, 2026 department-wide Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure policy explicitly establishes a consistent incentive framework across components. \[85\]

Outcomes.
Compliance becomes a continuous internalized enforcement arm: legal departments build surveillance, reporting, and training systems in anticipation of prosecutorial evaluation—often experienced inside firms as “rule by lawyers,” but structurally anchored in prosecutorial and sentencing authority. \[86\]

Plea bargaining and the managed production of guilt Link to heading

Context. Plea bargaining is now structurally central to criminal adjudication.

Actors. Prosecutors, defense counsel, courts, defendants.

Legal tactics used.
Charge bargaining and sentence leverage; defense counsel duties in the plea stage are constitutionalized.

Outcomes and evidence. The Supreme Court observed that “97 percent of federal convictions and 94 percent of state convictions” result from guilty pleas, making plea bargaining central enough that counsel’s competence in that process is constitutionally significant. \[87\] Contemporary BJS data similarly show that in FY 2023, about 89% of adjudicated federal defendants pled guilty, while a small fraction were convicted via trial. \[88\] The coercive-valence mechanism is not only incarceration; it includes procedural delay, risk, and resource asymmetry that pressure defendants toward pleas.

Administrative enforcement as legalized coercion with procedural legitimacy Link to heading

Context. Agencies enforce via investigations, administrative adjudications, and negotiated settlements.

Actors. Investigative lawyers, administrative law judges, regulated parties.

Legal tactics used.
Investigative subpoenas and staff recommendations: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission\[89\] describes investigations as private fact-development processes, with formal orders enabling subpoenas. \[90\]
Administrative adjudication: Federal Trade Commission\[91\] explains its administrative complaint process and trial-type adjudication before ALJs. \[92\]
Pre-enforcement review fights: Sackett v. EPA (2012) treated an EPA compliance order as reviewable under the APA, illustrating how procedural access to courts becomes a major axis of coercion vs. constraint. \[93\]

Outcomes.
Administrative enforcement highlights lawyer-operationalism: coercion is exercised through statutes + procedure, while legitimacy is maintained through review, notice, and adjudication rules. \[94\]

Corporate lawyering and lobbying as parallel policy pipelines Link to heading

Context. Lobbying is legally structured and disclosed; law firms and specialized lobbyists often serve as access brokers and rule-shapers.

Actors. Law firms, clients, executive officials, legislators; disclosure administrators.

Legal tactics used.
Formal lobbying plus procedural rule-shaping: the Lobbying Disclosure Act’s findings explicitly link “responsible representative Government” to public awareness of lobbying. \[95\]
In high-activity periods, major firms and lobby shops increase revenues and intensify policy work around tax, trade, and regulatory actions. \[96\]

Outcomes.
This resembles an “institutional attack vector” insofar as lawyers and lobbyists help organizations influence the rule environment; but the key analytic point is that this is a structurally permitted channel, not an extralegal conspiracy. \[97\]

Comparative notes beyond the U.S. Link to heading

The EU anti-SLAPP directive shows how jurisdictions can explicitly treat abusive litigation as a systemic democratic threat and build procedural shields. \[98\]
United Kingdom\[99\] policy documents and parliamentary discussions reflect similar concern about SLAPP-like abusive litigation in defamation and related areas. \[100\]

Mechanisms that make lawyers feel like “institutional attack dogs” Link to heading

Below is a mechanism map that explains why legal power is often experienced as moralized coercion.

flowchart TD
  A[Moral claim or political priority] --> B[Translation into legal categories]
  B --> C[Procedural routing]
  C --> D1[Court litigation]
  C --> D2[Agency enforcement]
  C --> D3[Contract/private governance]

  D1 --> E[Delay, cost, risk, precedent]
  D2 --> F[Investigation, subpoenas, settlements]
  D3 --> G[Arbitration clauses, compliance, monitoring]

  E --> H[Behavior change via pressure]
  F --> H
  G --> H

  H --> I[Legitimacy: "rule-following" appearance]
  I --> J[Institutional reproduction or reform]

Translation of moral claims into procedure Link to heading

Lawyers operationalize “moral” questions by translating them into legally cognizable claims: what counts as discrimination, conspiracy, defamation, negligence, or regulatory violation. This conversion is a form of power because it controls which grievances can be heard and what remedies exist—an idea strongly aligned with the sociological account of the juridical field’s symbolic authority. \[101\]

Delay, cost, and technicality as coercive pressure Link to heading

Empirically and theoretically, procedural complexity benefits “repeat players” with resources, expertise, and strategic patience. This mechanism is famously analyzed in Marc Galanter\[102\]’s account of why resource-rich parties tend to “come out ahead.” \[103\] SLAPP dynamics and anti-SLAPP law design explicitly target this mechanism by enabling early dismissal and fee shifting. \[104\] The Energy Transfer/Greenpeace litigation illustrates magnitude: civil procedure can create liabilities and interest/cost structures large enough to threaten organizational survival, regardless of one’s view of underlying facts. \[105\]

Credentialed legitimacy and institutional trust Link to heading

Professional authority is sustained by credentialing and ethical codes; legitimacy arises because legal professionals are seen as operating within rule-bound institutions. Weberian rational-legal legitimacy and professional-jurisdiction theory capture this dynamic. \[106\] The ABA’s own framing of lawyers as officers of the legal system and public citizens shows how the profession narrates its role as simultaneously partisan advocate and system steward. \[107\]

Counterarguments and constraints on legal power Link to heading

Lawyers as reformers and democratizers Link to heading

The civil-rights era provides a direct countermodel: lawyers acting as institutional challengers rather than “attack dogs.” NAACP LDF records and Brown’s legal outcome show legal strategy dismantling a prior moral order enforced through segregation doctrine. \[108\] Similarly, anti-SLAPP frameworks represent institutional self-correction against abusively weaponized litigation—now embedded not only in state statutes and model laws but also in EU-level directives. \[109\]

Structural checks: courts, procedure, and professional discipline Link to heading

Legal power is constrained by multiple layers:

Constitutional and judicial review: courts can invalidate statutes, limit agencies, and expand or contract access to review (e.g., administrative-law shifts such as Loper Bright and Corner Post reshape how agencies and regulated parties litigate). \[110\]
Procedural rights: due process doctrines, notice requirements, and reviewability can limit coercion (e.g., Sackett’s reviewability of compliance orders). \[93\]
Ethics rules and discipline: professional rules prohibit frivolous claims and impose confidentiality and other duties; bar discipline systems sanction misconduct (illustrated by large state-bar discipline caseloads and sanctions). \[111\]

What survives the critique Link to heading

A rigorous synthesis is:

Lawyers are rarely the origin of institutional moral priorities, but they are often the operators who make those priorities governable and enforceable. \[112\]
The “tyrannical” feel often comes less from lawyers personally than from procedural asymmetry (delay, cost, risk, expertise), which can be exploited strategically. \[113\]
The same machinery can produce hierarchy or liberation, depending on who mobilizes it, institutional context, and which constraints bite in practice. \[114\]

Comparative tables of examples by tactic, scale, and impact Link to heading

Case comparison matrix Link to heading

Example	Context	Core actors	Legal tactics	Scale	Likely institutional impact direction
Gilded Age corporate legalism	Corporate consolidation + state charter markets	State legislatures; corporate counsel; courts	Incorporation statutes; contract-liberty doctrine; antitrust enforcement	State + national	Stabilizes corporate order; contested constraints via antitrust \[115\]
Jim Crow legalism	Post-Reconstruction racial hierarchy	State governments; courts; registrars	Doctrinal narrowing; segregation legitimation; procedural disenfranchisement	Regional + national	Enforces hierarchical moral order via “legal legitimacy” \[32\]
New Deal administrative state	Expansion of federal regulation + social insurance	Agencies; Congress; executive	Statutory creation; judicial validation; APA proceduralization	National	Builds bureaucratic governance capacity (can feel coercive; also expands social provisioning) \[116\]
Civil-rights litigation	Moral reconstruction against segregation	NAACP LDF; courts; federal govt	Test-case strategy; constitutional interpretation	National	Counter-enforcement: dismantles prior hierarchy \[117\]
Regulatory capture ecosystem	Expertise + access asymmetry	Agencies; firms; revolving-door lawyers	Lobbying; rule comments; negotiated enforcement	National	Risks privileging organized interests; variable across domains \[118\]
SLAPP litigation	Chilling speech via process costs	Powerful plaintiffs; media/activists; courts	Defamation/tort claims; damages threats; early-dismissal defenses	State + cross-border	Often suppressive; mitigated where anti-SLAPP exists \[119\]
MDL mass tort governance	Docket management + settlement centralization	JPML; transferee judges; mass-tort firms	Centralization under §1407; bellwethers; global settlement structures	National	Mixed: enables scale compensation but concentrates procedural power \[120\]
Class actions + arbitration	Collective enforcement vs individualized procedure	Plaintiffs/defense counsel; courts	Certification tightening; arbitration enforcement	National	Often reduces collective private enforcement capacity \[121\]
Plea bargaining regime	Mass criminal case processing	Prosecutors; defense; courts	Charge leverage; negotiated pleas	National	High coercive potential; efficiency + rights tradeoffs \[122\]

Mechanism → tactic mapping Link to heading

Mechanism	Typical tactics	Representative sources
Translation of moral claims into legal categories	Claim framing; statutory drafting; doctrinal argument	\[123\]
Delay/cost/technicality as coercion	SLAPPs; discovery burden; trial-risk leverage; plea pressure	\[124\]
Credentialing + legitimacy	Bar licensing; ethics rules; institutional procedure	\[125\]

\[1\] \[6\] \[13\] \[106\] \[125\] THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS

https://vlb-content.vorarlberg.at/fhbscan1/330900040472.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com

\[2\] \[63\] https://www.uniformlaws.org/viewdocument/final-act-110?CommunityKey=4f486460-199c-49d7-9fac-05570be1e7b1&tab=librarydocuments

https://www.uniformlaws.org/viewdocument/final-act-110?CommunityKey=4f486460-199c-49d7-9fac-05570be1e7b1&tab=librarydocuments

\[3\] \[58\] https://economics.harvard.edu/files/economics/files/tabakovic-haris_2018-2-23_revolving_doors_tabakovic_wollmann_ec2888r.pdf

https://economics.harvard.edu/files/economics/files/tabakovic-haris_2018-2-23_revolving_doors_tabakovic_wollmann_ec2888r.pdf

\[4\] \[9\] \[99\] https://global.oup.com/academic/product/albions-seed-9780195069051

https://global.oup.com/academic/product/albions-seed-9780195069051

\[5\] \[51\] \[53\] \[72\] \[117\] https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep347/usrep347483/usrep347483.pdf

https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep347/usrep347483/usrep347483.pdf

\[7\] https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/24253

https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/24253